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We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with 
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that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private 
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Mixed oligopolies exist in many developing countries, especially in (fore-) communism 
countries. There are also industries in most western economies which can be seen as mixed 
oligopolies. In some industries, differentiated products are provided. However, most of the 
literature on mixed oligopolies has focused on the case of homogeneous goods. Cremer et al. 
(1991), Delbono et al. (1996), Ba′rcena-Ruiz (2007), Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008), among others, 
are some exceptions. Cremer et al. (1991) investigated under what conditions the social planner 
can obtain the first best in a horizontally differentiated mixed oligopoly setting. Delbono et al. 
(1996) analysed the endogenous quality choice in mixed duopoly using a vertical differentiation 
model and found that the public firm will choose to provide a product with higher quality than 
the private firm if it acts as a leader in the quality stage. On the contrary, using a Hotelling model 
of mixed duopoly with a quality dimension of product differentiation, Ishibashi and Kaneko 
(2008) showed that the public firm should provide lower quality to maximise social welfare. 
Using a model of exogenous product differentiation, Ba′rcena-Ruiz (2007) analysed endogenous 
timing in a Bertrand mixed duopoly with exogenous product differentiation and found that firms 
choose prices simultaneously. 
In this paper, we will investigate the issue of endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with 
endogenous product differentiation. We are interested in this issue for two reasons. First, in 
Delbono et al. (1996), the timing is exogenous. The authors first obtained two subgame perfect 
equilibria assuming firms act simultaneously in both quality stage and price stage and then 
showed that the public firm chooses a higher quality if it moves first in the quality stage and both 
firms move simultaneously in the price stage. What should the timing be when it is endogenized? 
Second, the issue of endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly with endogenous product 
  1differentiation has been examined by Lambertini (1996). He found that, in the non full market 
coverage situation, firms simultaneous playing in both the quality stage and the price stage is the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
1 Note that Lambertini (1996) introduced 
only one pre-play stage. In our opinion, doing so is inappropriate since it cannot ensure subgame 
perfection. To ensure subgame perfection, two pre-play stages should be introduced. Using the 
same method as in this paper, we find that the subgame perfect equilibrium requires simultaneity 
in the quality stage and sequentiality in the price stage.
2 What we are interested in is whether 
firms’ mixed objectives affect the distribution of roles and how if so. 
For our purpose, a two-stage game of endogenous timing with observable delay (a la 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)) is considered here in the context of sequential quality and price 
choice. The sequential choice of quality and price is adopted not only because this is standard in 
the literature such as Shaked and Sutton (1982), Cremer et al. (1991), Delbono et al. (1996), 
Lambertini (1996), etc. but also because by nature quality is a long-run variable while price is a 
short-run variable.
3 It is well known that firms can strategically choose product characteristics in 
order to soften price competition. Once product quality is chosen (determined by technology), it 
is fixed in quite a long time, while price is much easier to change. After introducing two pre-play 
stages, we have a four-stage game. In stage one (the first pre-play stage), firms simultaneously 
announce in which period they will choose their qualities and are committed to this 
announcement. In stage two, firms choose their qualities knowing when the other firm chooses 
its quality level. In the third stage (the second pre-play stage), after observing each firm’s quality 
                                                 
1 Lambertini (1996) distinguished two situations, full and non full market coverage. We consider only the latter 
situation since it is more realistic. With the given utility function, the consumers with low  do not purchase any 
good. 
2  The work is available upon request from the authors. We also proved that introducing only one pre-play stage does 
not ensure subgame perfection.   
3  Similarly, in models with horizontal product differentiation, firms choose locations first and then compete in 
prices or quantities. 
  2level, firms simultaneously announce with commitment in which period they will choose their 
prices. Finally in stage four, firms choose their prices knowing when the other firm chooses its 
price level. We find that in both the quality stage and the price stage, moving in the first 
opportunity is a strictly dominant strategy and thus the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game with observable delay is characterized by simultaneous play in the first opportunity in 
both stages.   
This result is different from the one in a purely private duopoly.
4 The intuition is as follows. 
In the price stage, the public firm wants to move in the first opportunity to prevent the private 
firm from charging a high price as a leader since the public firm cares about social welfare; the 
private firm also wants to move in the first opportunity since otherwise it would have to set a low 
price as a response to the public firm’s low price. On the contrary, in a purely private duopoly, 
firms want to move sequentially since given one firm sets price in the first opportunity, the other 
firm is better off by choosing a high price in the second opportunity (since prices are strategic 
complements and the first-mover chooses a high price). In the quality stage, regardless of a 
mixed duopoly setting or a purely private duopoly setting, each firm prefers moving in the first 
opportunity to avoid being a lower-quality producer. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is described. In 
Section 3, we analyse the model and derive the subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 4 
concludes with some remarks.   
 
2. The Model 
                                                 
4  This result is actually the same as what Lambertini (1996) found in a purely private duopoly. However, as we have 
emphasized, Lambertini introduced only one pre-play stage, while we introduce two to ensure subgame perfection. 
Ba′rcena-Ruiz (2007) also shows that in a private duopoly the endogenous timing requires firms to choose prices 
sequentially, though the author adopts a different model of product differentiation. 
  3The setup of the model is similar to the one in Delbono et al. (1996) except that now our 
focous is on endogenous timing. A vertically differentiated mixed duopoly market is considered 
with one public firm, called firm A, and one private firm, called firm B. The public firm’s 
objective is the maximisation of the social surplus (welfare) which is defined as the sum of 
consumer surplus and both firms’ profits, while the private firm is a profit-maximiser. 
Production costs are , where  
2 , Cqx qx  x  denotes quantity and  denotes quality. q
5 
On the demand side of the industry, there is a continuum of consumers whose total number 
is normalized to one. The good is indivisible and each consumer buys at most one unit. The 
utility of a consumer labeled   is given by 
i i    if the consumer buys one unit good with quality   at price 
0              otherwise.   






Consumers are heterogeneous and   is uniformly distributed over the interval  0,1 . The 
parameter     can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for quality. 
By finding the marginal consumers, one can easily obtain firms’ demand function: 
   1 H HL H L x ppqq    , and     L HL H L L L x ppqq p q    , where the subscripts H and 
L denote the firm producing the higher quality product and the one producing the lower quality 
product respectively. 
The public firm aims at maximising social welfare and the objective function is   
                                                 
5 We use the specific form of cost function for technical tractability. This function is also used in Delbono et al. 
(1996). One could use general cost function   ,x qx
  1 Cq , where  . However, introducing parameter   
makes the analysis very messy. Note that the cost function    , Cqx q x  cannot be used in this model, since an 
infinitesimal increment in the quality level    chosen by a firm is valued  dq dq  by the consumer labeled . Hence 
it is valued at mostdq . On the other hand, the increase in marginal cost is  . Hence no firm would find it 
profitable to produce any product with . A similar argument also suggests that no firm would want to choose q 
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and the private firm’s objective function is 

     
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.           ( 2 )  
We consider a four-stage game as described in the Introduction. Firms choose qualities and 
prices sequentially and there is one pre-play stage for the quality stage and one for the price stage. 
Our objective is to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of this 
extended game using backward induction. 
 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Endogenzing the Timing in the Price Stage 
Using backward induction, we obtain each firm’s payoff in fixed-timing games, namely, the 
simultaneous-move, public-leader, and public-follower games. After that, we can then obtain the 
endogenous timing in the price stage. Since we do not know which firm produces higher-quality 
product, we need to distinguish two cases, namely, the case of the public firm providing 
lower-quality product and the case of the public firm providing higher-quality product.
6 The 
detailed analysis is put in the Appendix. 
The endogenous timing in the price stage is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
6 Needless to say, which firm produces higher-quality product is endogenously determined. It will be addressed 
later. 
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the unique strictly dominant strategy equilibrium in the price stage no matter which firm 
provides higher quality product. 
Proof: Let a and b denote the qualities of the products provided by the public firm and the 
private firm respectively. Let the superscripts “S”, “F” and “L” denote “simultaneous-mover”, 
“follower” and “leader” respectively. 
In the case of the public firm providing lower-quality product,  ab  . In the appendix, we 
present each firm’s payoff in fixed-timing games. Clearly, we have  and
LS W W 
L S
b b    since 
a leader can always choose its simultaneous-move equilibrium price while the leader actually 
chooses a different price. These inequalities mean that a firm wants to act as a leader if the other 
firm moves in the second period. We also find   and 
S WW  F S
b b
F    . These inequalities 
mean that a firm wants to act as a simultaneous-mover if the other firm moves in the first period. 
In the case of the public firm providing higher-quality product,  . In the appendix, we 




b b    , 
, and 
S WW  F SF
b b    .  
Q.E.D 
This result is the same as the one in Ba′rcena-Ruiz (2007) who also investigated 
endogenous timing in a differentiated mixed duopoly when firms compete in prices but the 
product differentiation in his model is exogenous and the demand function is derived from a 
representative consumer’s utility maximisation problem. On the contrary, when firms compete in 
quantities in a homogeneous product market, the public firm and the private firm(s) producing 
  6simultaneously cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, as demonstrated 
by Pal (1998) and Lu (2006), among others. 
Intuitively, the public firm does not want to be a follower since if so the private firm, as a 
leader, would choose a high price level, which would lower the social welfare level. So the 
public firm will choose price level in the first opportunity. The private firm wants to do the same 
thing since being a follower means that it has to set a low price as a response to the public firm’s 
low price, yielding low profit level. 
 
3.2 Endogenzing the Timing in the Quality Stage 
Having found the unique Nash equilibrium in the price stage, we can now investigate 
endogenous timing in the quality stage. Again, we will first obtain each firm’s payoff in 
fixed-timing games. 
Since the equilibrium requires simultaneity in the price stage, the same as assumed in 
Delbono et al. (1996), we can use the results obtained by Delbono et al. (1996) directly. Delbono 
et al. (1996) investigated quality choice in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly assuming 
firms set prices simultaneously. Assuming firms choose qualities simultaneously, they found two 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one involving the public firm providing lower 
quality product and one involving the public firm providing higher quality product. In the former 
equilibrium, ,  , and the associated payoffs are   and 
. In the latter equilibrium,
0.259 a 
07
0.380 b  0.07755
S W 
0.009 S
b   0.390 a  ,  0.260 b  , and the associated payoffs are 
 and  . They also found the Stackelberg equilibrium with the public 
firm as a leader. In this equilibrium,
0.07792
S W  0.00741  S
b 





 and  . 0.00652 F
b   7 They did not consider the Stackelberg equilibrium with the 
public firm as a follower to which we now turn. 
When  , it can be shown that the private firm’s maximum profit is attained at 
 (which implies that the best reply of the public firm is 
a 
0.253 a  ). The maximum 
profit level is  and the associated welfare level is  0.00934 b   0.07693 W  . When  ba  , it 
can be shown that the private firm’s maximum profit is attained at  0.287 b   (which implies 
that the best reply of the public firm is  0.395 a  ). The maximum profit level is 
and the associated welfare level is  0.00756 b   0.07738 W  . So in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium with the public firm as a follower,  0.253 a  and 0.350 b  , and the associated 
payoffs are  and  .  0  .07693
L
b  F W 0.00934 
The endogenous timing in the quality stage can be summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2:  Both the public firm and the private firm choosing qualities in the first 
opportunity is the unique strictly dominant strategy equilibrium in the quality stage.   
Proof: Clearly, regardless of which equilibrium arises in the simultaneous-move game, that is, 
regardless of     55,0.00907 , 0.077 SS
b W   or     , 0.07792,0.00741 SS
b W   , we 
have
L SF
b b b      (0.00934>max{0.00907, 0.00741}>0.00652) and  
(0.07801>max{0.07755, 0.07792}>0.07693). So choosing quality level in the first opportunity is 
each firm’s strictly dominant strategy. 
LS WWW 
F
                                                
Q.E.D. 
 
7  The authors did not compute the private firm’s profit. It is straightforward to obtain it. 
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choose a low quality level (but still high enough so that the public firm will choose an even 
lower quality level), which would lower the social welfare level. So the public firm will choose 
quality level in the first opportunity. The private firm wants to do the same thing since being a 
follower means being a lower-quality provider (since the public firm chooses higher quality), 
yielding low profit level. 
It should be noted that Lambertini (1999) showed that in a private duopoly firms also 
choose qualities simultaneously in the first opportunity given firms’ simultaneous price 
competition. It turns out producing higher quality is a strictly dominant strategy for any firm 
regardless of the firm’s ownership. 
 
3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
Combining propositions 1 and 2, we summarize the main result in the form of a theorem. 
Theorem: In a quality-then-price game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed 
duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in 
pure strategies is characterized by simultaneous play in the first opportunity in both the quality 
stage and the price stage. 
Compared with endogenous timing in the same setting in a purely private duopoly, the 
timing in the price stage is different while the timing in the quality stage is the same. We have 
explained why it is so in the Introduction section. Because a public firm cares about social 
welfare, it prefers moving in the first opportunity in the price stage and the private firm has the 
same preference knowing that it would have to choose low price if moving in the second 
opportunity. However, this is not the case in the purely private duopoly. In the purely private 
  9duopoly, each firm prefers followership to simultaneous play in the price stage, sequentiality is 
thus required. In the quality stage, each firm prefers moving in the first opportunity to avoid 
being a lower-quality producer. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we consider endogenous order of moves in the observable delay game of 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a “two-stage” game of quality and price setting in 
a mixed duopoly. We find that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies is 
characterized by simultaneous play in the first opportunity in both stages. The result is different 
from the one in a purely private duopoly which is characterized by simultaneous play in the 
quality stage and sequential play in the price stage. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium obtained in our analysis is the consequence of the 
interaction between the public firm and the private firm. Since the public firm aims at 
maximising social welfare, it wants to move in the first opportunity in both the quality stage and 
the price stage so that the overall product quality is high and the price is low. Anticipating the 
public firm’s behavior, the private firm does not want to be a follower either. 
 
Appendix 
In this appendix, we show how to derive each firm’s payoff in fixed-timing games when 
firms compete in prices, namely, the simultaneous-move, public-leader, and private-leader games. 
Let a and b denote the qualities of the products provided by the public firm and the private firm 
respectively. Let the superscripts “S”, “F” and “L” denote “simultaneous-mover”, “follower” and 
“leader” respectively. 
  10A.1 The case of the public firm providing lower-quality product 
In this case,  .  ab 
In this case, (1) becomes 
   
 
       
1




pa p p b a
ba a ba
Wa d b d




    
             ( 3 )  
and (2) becomes   
      
2 1 bb b a p bp p b a    .                          ( 4 )  




ab p ap b a b b   ,                            ( 5 )  
 
2 2 ba p p bab    .                            ( 6 )  
Once the reaction functions are obtained, one can then solve for the equilibrium prices in 
the three fixed-timing games. Once the equilibrium prices are derived, it is then straightforward 
to get each firm’s payoff in each fixed-timing game which is presented below. 
1) Simultaneous move 
  
2 22 S
a pa b a a b b b a    ,    
22 2 S
b pb b a aba b b a      , 
    
22 2 12 S
b bba ab ba      , 
  
43 2 2432 232
2 35 5 224 6 632
22
S b
W b ab ab a a ab a b b b a b
ba
       

 . 
2) Public leader 
  11  
22 42 4 3 L
a pa b a a b a b b a   , 
  
22 3 32 2 232 2 2 4 3 F
b pab a b b a a b a b b a    , 
      
22 21 4 F
b ba ba ab b a      
2 3 , 
  
433 2 2 432 232 2 1
33 5 2 2 4 6 3
24 3
L W b ab a b a b a a a b ab b b ab a
ba
         

 . 
3) Public follower 
 12 F
a paa b   ,   12 L
b pba b   , 
2 14 L
b ba b    , 
 
22 3522 6 3
8
F b
Wb a a b a b      . 
Clearly, we have  and
L WW 
S L S
b b    since a leader can always choose its 
simultaneous-move equilibrium price while the leader actually chooses a different price. We can 
also find 
    
22 431 8 2 0 SF WW a b b a a b b a      , 
       
22 2 2 22 18 7 2 4 3 SF
b b ab a a b a b a b b a b a         0 . 
 
A.2 The case of the public firm providing higher-quality product 
In this case,  .  Following the same procedure as in Subsection A.1, we get each 
firm’s payoff in each fixed-timing game. 
ab 
1) Simultaneous move 
  
22 22 S
a pa a b a b   ,    
22 2 S
b pb aa b b a b   , 
  12  
2 3 2 S
b a b ab ab    , 


2 443 2 2 3 3 2 2
2 45 4 8 8 2 2
22
S a
Wa b a b a b a b a a b a b
ab
         
 
a b  . 
2) Public leader 
  
32 2 42 4 3 L
a pa a b a ba   b ,    
22 22 4 3 F
b pb a b a b a b    , 
    
22 24 3 F
b a b ab ab a b    , 
  
33 2 2 425 684 3
24 3
L a
Wa b a b a b a
ab
    

a b  . 
3) Public follower 
 22 F
a pa a b ,   22 L
b pb a b  , 
2 4 L





Wa b a b a     . 
Clearly, we have  and
LS WW 
L S
b b    . We can also find 
  
2 22438 2 0 SF WW a ba b a b     , 
     
22 22 2 87 2 4 3 SF
b b a bab a b a b ab a b        
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